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ARGUMENT 
Appellants hereby submit the following reply in this appeal 
from the district court's grant of "summary judgment" against 
appellants' petition to review an administrative decision of the 
Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corporation, granting a 
variance to the Market Street Broiler & Fish Market to build a 
garbage dumpster enclosure without providing the ten foot 
landscaped rear yard and buffer required by city ordinances. 
Four appellees are named in this appeal. TTJ Partnership 
and Gastronomy, Inc., are entities related to the Market Street 
Broiler & Fish Market, and John Williams is a principal in TTJ 
Partnership and Gastronomy, Inc. None of these three appellees 
have bothered to file an opposing brief. Their failure to defend 
against this appeal implies they admit the arguments set forth in 
appellants' brief. 
While the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corporation 
filed a responsive brief (oddly calling its brief in opposition a 
"reply" brief), the Board failed to address the main issues 
raised in appellants' main brief—first, the Board of 
Adjustment's failure to make any findings of fact relevant to the 
statutory conditions for granting a variance, renders its 
decision arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, and second, the 
Board's failure to apply the correct legal standards for granting 
a variance rendered its decision illegal. 
Instead of responding to the merits of appellants' main 
arguments, the Board's brief first focuses on appellants' third 
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issue—the appropriateness of the district court's applying 
summary judgment procedures to what is essentially an appeal 
Then the Board throws out four "grounds" the district court could 
have used to grant summary judgment. As the Board of Adjustment 
points out, it not entirely clear what the basis of the court's 
ruling was, since the court did not issue a written statement of 
the ground for its decision as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
A fair reading of the Board's motion for summary judgment and 
supporting memorandum indicate that the motion contained two 
grounds: (1) that the Board of Adjustment's decision is supported 
by substantial evidence in the record; and (2) that the Board of 
Adjustment is not a proper party to the petition for review. In 
ruling from the bench, however, the court indicated that his 
decision was based on the first ground: that the agency's 
decision was supported by substantial evidence. 
The alternate grounds for summary judgment argued by the 
Board of Adjustment are mere straw men. These arguments 
demonstrate the absurdity of the use of summary judgment 
procedures to dispose of a petition to the district court to 
review an administrative decision. 
I. The Board of Adjustment is An Indispensable Party to a Review Proceeding 
Citing no authority whatever, the Board of Adjustment 
baldly asserts that it is not a proper party, as it does not 
have the capacity to sue or be sued. It is, however, 
elementary law that the Board of Adjustment is a proper 
party respondent. In fact, in most jurisdictions, the board 
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of adjustment is considered an indispensable party. 83 Am 
Jur 2nd Zoning and Planning § 1043 (Lawyers Cooperative 
1992); 4 Ziegler, Rathkopfs The Law of Zoning and Planning 
§ 42.05 at 42-47 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1995). In 
considering the proper or necessary parties respondent, one 
authority writes: 
The board whose decision is sought to be 
reviewed must be a party. The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts has noted that if the 
members of the board could not be made defendants, 
there would be many instances when no one could be 
made a defendant and no suit could be brought. In 
some jurisdictions, the board of appeals is the 
only indispensable party to an appeal from the 
board's decision. This may derive from the nature 
of the writ of certiorari, on which review 
proceedings are based, where the only 
indispensable party defendant was the agency which 
had custody of the record to be certified and sent 
to the court for review. 
4 Ziegler, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 42.05 at 
42-47. (Footnotes omitted). 
In accord with the above authorities, the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act provides that a party seeking 
judicial review of a state agency's action must file a petition 
naming "the agency and all other appropriate parties as 
respondents." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(b). 
The Board of Adjustment's assertion that the Board is not an 
entity with the capacity to sue or be sued illustrates the 
confusion resulting from treating an appeal from an 
administrative decision like an ordinary lawsuit. This case is 
not a suit. Appellees are not "suing" anybody. There is no 
"complaint" here. There are no damages being sought. There is 
3 
no trial. There is no discovery. The conventional trappings of 
a lawsuit, including pretrial motions, such as motions for 
summary judgment, do not "fit" a petition to review an 
administrative decision because the petition is essentially an 
appeal, not a "suit." Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 
F.3d 1560, 1579-1580 (10th Cir. 1994). (holding that motions to 
affirm and motions for summary judgment are inconsistent with the 
federal APA, and prohibiting the use of such procedural devices 
in administrative appeals). 
II. Marshalling the Evidence is Unnecessary Where the Findings Below are 
Legally Insufficient 
The Board of Adjustment argues that petitioners' failure to 
marshal the evidence in support of the Board's decision is 
sufficient grounds for granting the Board's motion for summary 
judgment. This assertion misses petitioners' main point on 
appeal—the Board made no findings. At least, the Board made no 
findings relevant to the statutory standards it was obligated to 
apply to the evidence. Without adequate findings, the court 
cannot review an administrative agency's decision. Milne Truck 
Lines v. Public Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986). 
Where the agency or lower court's findings are absent, 
conclusory, or legally insufficient, marshaling the evidence is 
not required. Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990, 
993 n. 3 (Utah 1993) (appellants are not required to marshal the 
evidence where appellants' argument is that the trial court did 
not comply with the applicable rules as a matter of law in 
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granting a permanent injunction); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 
635, 638 (Utah App. 1995) (appellants need not engage in a futile 
marshaling exercise if they can demonstrate the findings are 
legally insufficient); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah 
App. 1991) (appellants need not marshal the evidence where the 
court's findings are conclusory). Here, petitioners contend that 
the Board's sole "finding" is legally insufficient. The Board of 
Adjustment applied an incorrect legal standard in granting the 
variances. Petitioners are not required to marshal the evidence 
relied on by the Board of Adjustment in making its decision where 
petitioners' argument is based on the legal insufficiency of the 
Board's findings. 
Here again, the Board's argument that petitioners failed to 
marshal the evidence demonstrates the procedural quagmire 
resulting from trying to dispose of a petition to review under 
summary judgment procedures and standards. Utah R. Civ P. 56 
does not contain a marshaling requirement—such a requirement 
would be inconsistent with the purpose of summary judgment. In 
appealing a grant of summary judgment, the appellant's burden is 
merely to show the appeals court that a material fact is 
disputed, or that the lower court misinterpreted or misapplied 
the law. Marshaling all the evidence in support in support of 
the lower court's decision would not assist the appeals court in 
evaluating the appropriateness of summary judgment under either 
standard for granting summary judgment. Marshaling is helpful, 
however, where the standard is whether the lower court or 
agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence. The 
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substantial evidence test applies in an appellate context, while 
summary judgment is a tool of the trial court. Here, the Board 
of Adjustment wants to have it both ways. 
III. The Reviewing Court Does Not Owe the Board's Decision Any Deference 
Where the Board Overstepped the Boundaries of its Legislatively 
Delegated Authority 
The Board of Adjustment argues that the reviewing court must 
affirm the Board's decision if, in light of the evidence, a 
"reasonable" person could have reached the same conclusion as the 
Board, and that the Board's actions must be accorded substantial 
deference. Even if true—the Board has misstated the standard— 
these arguments completely miss the point of this appeal. 
Petitioners' appeal is based on the Board's application of the 
wrong legal standard and the legal insufficiency of its findings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 contains a two-pronged standard of 
review of decisions of a municipal board of adjustment: the court 
may not affirm the Board's decision if (1) the decision is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal; or (2) the decision is not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Board keeps 
dropping the word "illegal" from the phrase, "arbitrary and 
capricious." In Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that the board of adjustment's 
decision to grant a variance was arbitrary and capricious where 
there was simply no evidence in the record to support any one of 
the board's boilerplate findings, and what evidence existed 
tended only to support a denial of the variance. Id. at 1135. 
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This case is just like Chambers v. Smithfield City, except that 
here, the Board of Adjustment did not even make boilerplate 
findings. 
Patterson v, Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 
(Utah App. 1995) and Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1981), cited by the Board of Adjustment, are inapplicable to this 
case, because both involve "special exceptions," not "variances," 
to the zoning ordinances. The standards governing special 
exceptions are different than those governing variances. A board 
of adjustment may grant a variance only if five very specific 
conditions set out by the Utah legislature in Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9-707 (2) are met. The state legislature, however, permits 
the local legislative body to devise its own standards for 
allowing special exceptions. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-706 (2). The 
zoning ordinances at issue in Patterson and Thurston contained 
very broad standards. A board of adjustment necessarily 
exercises wide discretion in deciding whether to grant a special 
exception. See Patterson, 893 P.2d at 605; Thurston, 626 P.2d at 
443-444. Boards of adjustment do not enjoy the same latitude 
with variances because the state legislature has imposed 
stringent standards on granting variances, which the boards of 
adjustment are bound to follow. 
The Board quotes Thurston v. Cache County for the 
proposition that the board's decisions are afforded a strong 
presumption of validity. The Board, however, omitted the first 
part of the paragraph which greatly qualifies any such 
presumption: 
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County zoning authorities are bound by the terms 
and standards of the applicable zoning ordinance, and 
are not at liberty either to grant or deny conditional 
use permits in derogation of legislative standards. 
Within the boundaries established by such standards, 
however, the zoning authority is afforded a broad 
latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded 
a strong presumption of validity. 
Thurston, 626 P.2d at 444-445. (Emphasis added). 
Here, the Board simply ignores petitioners' contention that 
the Board acted out of the boundaries of the legislative 
standards by failing to make any findings regarding the criteria 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(2)(a). Any presumption of 
validity or deference to its technical experience in planning and 
zoning that the Board enjoyed is lost when the Board oversteps 
the boundaries of its delegated authority. Sandy City v. Salt 
Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 218 (Utah 1992). 
The Board further argues that the Board is not required to 
make specific findings. This argument is specious. In 
subsection 2(b), the statute explicitly prohibits a board of 
adjustment from "finding" the existence of unreasonable hardship 
unless certain conditions are met, and it proscribes the 
conditions under which the Board "may find" the existence of 
special circumstances. The legislature clearly expected boards 
of adjustment to make specific findings relevant to each of the 
statutory criteria. 
Next, the Board recites several pieces of "evidence" that it 
contends support the statutory criteria even though the Board did 
not make specific findings. The Board is wrong—this evidence has 
no bearing on the legal criteria. 
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(1) At the hearing, there was conflicting evidence as to the 
location of the Market Street Broiler's dumpsters over the past 
ten years. Nevertheless, the fact that the dumpsters had been 
illegally squatting in the rear yard-buffer for the past ten 
years does not support a finding of unreasonable hardship or 
special circumstances as defined by the statute and case law. 
(2) The fact that the Market Street Broiler generates a 
large amount of trash and does not have the space to store it 
inside the building is evidence of a self-imposed and personal 
hardship, not a hardship related to the property, as more fully 
explained in petitioners' main brief on appeal. 
(3) The Market Street Broiler's ability to provide a buffer 
to the south parking lot adjacent to its building was also 
disputed during the hearing. In any event, the south parking lot 
was not the subject of the variance request, and is irrelevant to 
the case before the Board of Adjustment and this appeal. 
(4) Allys are not included in the rear yards or buffers 
required by Salt Lake City ordinances 21.52.060 and 21.78.020. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 21.78.020 provides that where a lot in 
any business district abuts a lot in any residential district, a 
landscaped buffer of at least ten feet shall be provided along 
such abutting line. Salt Lake City Ordinance 21.04.010 defines 
"abutting" to mean "adjacent or contiguous and shall include 
property separated by an alley." Thus, a lot in a business 
district "abuts" a lot in a residential district even if there is 
an alley separating the two lots. A landscaped buffer or rear 
yard is still required for the business district lot. 
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(5) The fact that the illegal placement of the dumpsters in 
the rear yard may have preceded the adoption of the area master 
plan is totally irrelevant to the granting of a variance. The 
master plan does not regulate or define dumpster location, rear 
yards, or buffers. A variance, by definition, is permission to 
vary from the city's zoning ordinances, not from the master plan. 
The Board failed to connect its "supporting evidence" to any 
one of the five criteria listed in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(2). 
None of the evidence "marshaled" by the Board of Adjustment in 
support of its decision is relevant to whether substantial 
evidence supported the Board's decision or to the issue on appeal 
as to the lack of findings and the illegality of the Board's 
actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Lastly, the Board argues that petitioners impermissibly 
supplemented the administrative record with matters outside the 
record, and therefore, summary judgment is an appropriate 
sanction for such outrageous behavior. This argument is so 
nonsensical that petitioners will not waste the court's time 
refuting it except to note that, thanks to petitioners' efforts, 
the Board of Adjustment was forced to supplement the 
administrative record twice. 
The Board of Adjustment ignored the merits of petitioners' 
argument that it acted illegally in granting the variance. The 
Board's brief does not dispute petitioners' statement of the 
facts, the issue, or the case; it does not attempt to distinguish 
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the cases or authorities cited by petitioners; it does not point 
,to any evidence in the record relevant to the statutory standards 
for granting a variance, nor does it cite any cases that are 
relevant to the merits. 
The Board offers no real opposition to the argument that it 
stepped over the boundaries of its legislatively delegated 
authority in granting the variances to the Market Street Broiler 
& Fish Market. The district court's grant of summary judgment is 
tantamount to saying that the Board may proceed to grant 
variances based on its own notions of the best solutions to the 
cases that come before it, without any regard to the standards 
mandated by the Utah State Legislature, and without any fear of 
meaningful judicial review. 
Petitioners respectfully request that the Court of Appeals 
reverse the decision of the district court granting summary 
judgment to the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City 
Corporation, and order that the decision of the Board of 
Adjustment in Case No. 2150-B be vacated. 
Dated this P th day of November, 1996. 
LINDA LEPREAU 
Attorney for Petitioners and Appellants 
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